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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellee The Salt Lake County Firemen's Civil Service 
Commmission (the "Commission") submits that the proper statement 
of this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal is found at Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (b) (1996), not at Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (a) (1996) as is alleged by appellant James R. Collins 
("Collins"). 
The section that Collins relies on provides this Court with 
jurisdiction over "the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudactive proceedings of state agencies or appeals from 
the district court review of informal adjudacative proceedings of 
the agencies . . .." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (emphasis 
added). This section does not apply to the current case. 
Collins is appealing from district court review of a formal 
adjudacative proceeding before the Commission, which is not an 
agency of the state, but rather of Salt Lake County, a political 
subdivision of the state. 
Because the Commission is a County agency and because 
Collins is appealing from district court review of the 
Commission's adjudicative proceedings, the proper source for this 
Court's jurisdcition is found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (b) 
which provides that this Court has jurisdiction over "appeals 
form the district court review of (i) adjudacative proceedings of 
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agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local 
agencies . . . . " The Commission submits that this section 
describes the proper foundation of this Court's appellate review 
of this case, rather than the section cited by Collins. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The Commission does not dispute Collins' characterization 
of any of the issues on appeal except that in the last issue that 
he raises, the Commission submits that the wrong standard of 
review is utilized. 
The Commission submits that this issue is governed by the 
standard of review in Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 
P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1991). In that case this Court stated that, 
"under Rule 65B, this court looks at the administrative 
proceedings as if the petition were brought here directly, even 
though technically it is the district court's decision that is 
being appealed." Id. at 26 (citing Erkamn v. Civil Service 
Comm'n, 198 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah 1948) . "This court gives no 
deference to the district court's initial appellate review since 
it was a review of the record, which this court is just as 
capable of reviewing as the district court." Id. (Citations 
ommitted). 
The Commission agrees with Collins that the proper standard 
under which htis court should review the Commission's findings of 
fact is the substantial evidence test. 
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RELEVANT STATUTORY AND RULE PROVISIONS 
With the exception of Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Commmission agrees that Collins has provided this 
Court with all the relevant statutory provisions on this appeal. 
The text of those rules are laid out in the Addendum to this 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case: 
The Commission agrees with the bulk of Collins' statement of 
the nature of this case. It must be noted however, that this 
case was before the district court pursuant to Rule 65B of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below. 
On or about July 5, 1988, Appellant James R. Collins 
("Collins") filed a grievance with the Salt Lake County Firemen's 
Civil Service Commission ("Commission"). (R. 673). In this 
grievance Collins challenged three specific sections of an 
examination that the Commission had given in January of that 
yearto establish the promotion register for the position of 
Battalion Chief within the Salt Lake County Fire Department. (R. 
00675). A hearing was held before the Commission on July 20, 
1988. (R. 678). Collins was represented by legal counsel, Duane 
R. Smith, Esq. represented Collins at that hearing. (R. 679). 
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After the hearing (R. 680-839), the Commission issued its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision, on August 18, 
1988. (R. 886-899). In its decision, the Commission found that 
there was no "reasonable basis for overturning the results of the 
examination and . . . [held] that the examination results and 
promotability register be affirmed." (R. 898). 
Collins then filed a verified Complaint in district court on 
September 16, 1988. (R. 1-10). In this complaint, Collins 
asserted that jurisdiction in the district court was pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-28-13. (R. 2). In response, the Commission 
filed a Motion to Dismiss the action on September 23, 1988. This 
motion was based on the Commission's belief that Utah Code Ann. § 
17-28-13 did not provide any basis for district court review of 
the Commission hearing. (R. 3 0-37). 
In a Minute Entry dated October 7, 1988, the district court, 
per Judge Scott Daniels, denied the defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss. (R. 62). This Minute Entry was more fully explained in 
an order dated January 12, 1989. In which the district court 
explained that Collins' remedy was uby way of a writ of Mandamus 
pursuant to Rule 65B(b)(2)." (R. 85). The court further added: 
"That pursuant to Rule 65B, the inquiry by this court shall be 
limited to a determination of whether or not the Fire Civil 
Service Commission abused its discretion or exceeded its 
authority." (Id.). Collins made no objection to this order. 
Rather he amended his complaint to assert jurisdiction pursuant 
to that subdivision of that rule. (R. 65). 
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On April 21, 1989, the Commission filed a general objection 
to Collins' Request for Interrogatories. (R. 92-96). The 
Commission stated that all the documents requested by Collins 
were beyond the scope of review of an action pursued through Utah 
R.Civ. P. 65B(b)(2). (R. 92-93). On May 22, 1989, Collins filed 
a Motion to Compel Discovery. (R. 102-113). Accompanied by a 
Memorandum of Support. (R. 97-101). In that Memorandum, Collins 
acknowledged that the jurisdiction of the district court was 
pursuant to U.R.C.P. 65B(b)(2). (R. 97-98). However, Collins 
also declared that the "position taken by Plaintiff is that 
Defendants in administering a promotional examination which is 
blatantly discriminatory and biased, have thereby exceeded their 
jurisdiction and have not "regularly pursued [their] authority.'" 
(R. 98). 
On May 25, 1989, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss 
defendant Larry Hinman. (R. 135). On this same date, the 
Commission also filed a Motion to Define the Scope of Review. 
(R. 137). The Commission again argued that the district court's 
scope of review in the case was "limited to an examination of the 
certified record of the proceedings, below." (R. 138). By Minute 
Entry on June 23, 1989, the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss 
Defendant Hinman and took under advisement the other motions. 
(R. 145). In another Minute Entry dated November 7, 1989, the 
judge ruled that "Plaintiff is entitled to prove that the 
decision of the Salt Lake County Firemen's Civil Service 
Commission was capricious, arbitrary, or beyond its 
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jurisdiction." (R. 146). The court therefore granted Collins' 
motion to compel. (Id.) 
The next entry on the record was recorded almost two years 
later on October 31, 1991. On that date, the district court 
issued, sua sponte, an Order to Show Cause why the matter should 
not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (R. 152) . A second 
show cause order was issued from the district court on January 8, 
1992. (R. 156). On January 22, 1992 a Notice of Entry of 
Appearance of Counsel was filed for Collins. (R. 158). On 
January 29, 1992 the Commission filed a Motion to Dismiss for 
Failure to Prosecute, accompanied by supporting memorandum. (R. 
160-171) . This motion was opposed by Collins. (R. 174-234) . 
About this time, the continuing disagreement between the 
parties concerning discovery and the scope of review began again 
on March 26, 1992. On that date, Collins filed anoLher Motion to 
Compel discovery accompanied by a Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in support thereof. (R. 238-246). In that 
Memorandum, Collins characterized the issue before the court as 
"whether or not [the Commission] acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in the examination of James R. Collins for Battalion 
Chief." (R. 244). 
On July 10, 19 92 the Commission filed a Motion to Set Aside 
and Objection to the Order (R. 273-274) and an accompanying 
Memorandum in support thereof. (R. 275-285). In that 
Memorandum, the Commission asserted that the Order to Compel 
Discover should not have been granted without the court having 
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ruled on the Commission's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 278-279). The 
Commission again argued that the case should have been dismissed 
for failure to prosecute. (R. 279-282). Collins opposed this 
motion. (R. 286-289). In his Memorandum Collins characterized 
his action as one "to seek a declaration of this Court that the 
Salt Lake County Firemen's Civil Service Commission abused is 
discretion and/or exceeded its authority in the creation of and 
administration of a Battalion Chief promotional examine (sic) 
administered in January, 1988." (R. 286). In a Minute Entry 
dated September 24, 1992, the court, per Judge Iwasaki, denied 
the Commission's Motion to Set Aside the Discovery Order. (R. 
300) . 
The next significant entry in the record is a Motion, 
accompanied by a memorandum, filed by the Commission on July 29, 
1994, to Limit the Court's Review. (R. 349-362). The Commission 
argued that the proper scope of the court's review on a Rule 65B 
action such as Collins' was limited to an examination of the 
record in the hearing below. (Id.) In Collins' opposition 
memorandum to this motion (R. 3 63-393), he argued that he was 
entitled to de novo review before the district court (R. 367-
371), and that the interests of justice so demanded. (R. 371-
374). The Commission replied, again asserting its argument that 
Rule 65B limited the review to one on the record. (R. 394-399). 
The district court entered the following order after considering 
the motion: 
1. The July 20, 1988 hearing before the Salt 
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Lake County Firemen's Civil Service Commission is 
considered to be a formal proceeding by the Court. 
2. Rule 65(b) [sic] of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, however, provides the Court with the 
opportunity to provide equitable remedies to an 
aggrieved party and although the Court will, for the 
most part, conduct the review of the Firemen's Civil 
Service Commission proceedings as an appellate Court, 
it will examine issues of due process violations, and 
will allow some de novo testimony regarding facts in 
dispute. 
3. Those facts in dispute are the authorship and 
administration of the Battalion Chief exam in 
controversy, as well as the statements of Defendant 
Larry Hinman and the Salt Lake County Personnel 
Director J.D. Johnson regarding exams as set forth and 
contained in a video tape which was transmitted to 
Firefighter's in Salt Lake County. 
4. As a consequence, the Court will examine such 
statements when considering issued of proper 
administration of the test, abuse of discretion, and 
whether or not the Civil Service Commission failed to 
act as required by statute. 
(R. 407). 
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On August 28, 1995, the Commission filed a Motion to Dismiss 
with accompanying memorandum. (R. 438-480). The Commission 
argued that Collins had failed to name necessary and 
indispensable parties to the action. (R. 444-450). The basis of 
this argument was that the other candidates to the exam who had 
been promoted from the certified register established by the 1988 
exam had due process rights that would be affected by any 
decision of the Court affecting the 1988 exam. (Id.). 
Collins filed an Opposition Memorandum to this motion on 
September 8, 1995. (R. 481-508). In that Memorandum, Collins 
contended that the other parties were not necessary because 
complete relief could be granted Collins without the other 
candidates being named. Specifically, Collins asserted that any 
action decertifying the results of the exam, or demoting any 
current Battalion Chiefs was mooted by the January 12, 1989 
decision of Judge Daniels. (R. 486). Collins acknowledged that 
the remedy he sought from the Commission was promotion to the 
rank of Battalion Chief and back pay from 1988. (Id.). 
In its Reply Memorandum on this motion filed on September 
13, 1995, the Commission argued that the relief requested by 
Collins could not be granted by the Commission. (R. 509-512). 
The Commission contended that it could not be ordered t i promote 
Collins or give him back pay because both of those remedies were 
beyond the statutory authority of the Commission. (R. 509-511). 
The Court in an Order dated October 11, 1995, denied the 
Commission's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 516). The Court further 
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ordered that "Collins' requested remedies of promotion and back 
pay shall not be considered at trial, but the court may remand 
these issues with directions to the Fire Civil Service 
Commission." (Id.). The Court then ordered that Collins was 
limited to calling two witnesses at trial. (R. 517). 
The case came on for hearing before Judge Iwasaki on October 
13, 1995. (R. 564-590). At the hearing, the Court indicated that 
it was familiar with the record below. (R. 565-566). The court 
allowed the testimony of two witnesses, Larry Hinman, the former 
Chief of the Salt Lake County Fire Department, (R. 568-578); and 
Clare Rasmussen, a former member of the Commission (R. 578-581). 
After hearing argument and the testimony , the district court 
denied Collins' appeal in its Findings of Fact and Decision, 
dated November 17, 1995. (R. 550-556). 
Specifically, the Court found: 
16. The Court finds n[T]hat its review is of the 
record with additional testimony for a limited purpose 
and not a trial de novo. The record below is reviewed 
to determine if the Fire Civil Service Commission 
abused its discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction. 
The Court finds that the decision of the Fire Civil 
Service Commission of August 18, 1988 was rational and 
reasonable. 
17. The Court, in its review of the record, gives 
great deference to the findings of fact contained in 
the decision of August 18, 1985. The decision 
contained substantial facts that were supported by the 
record and the Court finds no abuse of discretion by 
the Fire Civil Service Commission in reaching its 
decision. 
18. The Court finds that the Administrative 
Hearing process conducted by the Fire Civil Service 
Commission, although not perfect, was fair and not 
unconstitutional. 
• • # • 
20. The Court finds that the Fire Civil Service 
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Commission decision on May 25, 1995 concerning 
discovery requests by the plaintiff were rational and 
reasonable." 
(R. 554) . 
Collins then filed this appeal. 
C. Statement of the Facts. 
1. Appellant Collins is currently and was in 1988, a Captain 
with the Salt Lake County Fire Department. 
2. In January of 1988, then Chief Larry Hinman requested, 
pursuant to statute and policy that the Salt Lake County 
Firemen's Civil Service Commission prepare a promotional register 
for the position of Battalion Chief (R. 30). 
3. In response to that request, the Commission administered an 
examination to eight candidates seeking promotion to that rank. 
(R. 31). 
4. The exam consisted of five competitive portions. (R. 887). 
5. The exam also considered the seeniority of the candidates. 
(Id.) . 
6. The five competitive portions of the exam were as follows: 
(1) a written exercise, worth 20% of the weight of the exam; (2) 
a Department Promotability rating, worth 3 0% of the total weight 
of the exam; (3) Fire Simulation Problem, worth 2 0%; (4) an 
individual oral interview worth 15%; and (5) a leaderless group 
discussion, worth 15%. (R. 887-888). The final possible 10% of 
the exam was from the seniority rating. (R. 588). 
7. Collins grieved three specific portions (the promotability, 
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fire simulation and written exercise) to the Commission. He felt 
hose sections Mid not comply with § 17-28-7, Utah Code 
Annotated, which requires that such examination shall be 'public, 
competitive and fair' and that such examination 'shall fairly 
test the fitness in every respect of persons examined'". (R. 
675) . 
The specific allegations that Collins made regarding the 
examination were as follows. 
8. He challenged that because the evaluators of these three 
sections were members of the fire department they were biased. 
Collins contended that they were especially biased against him 
because none of the evaluators had "specific, first hand and 
current knowledge regarding [Collins7] performance." (R. 675). 
9. He challenged the promotability section of the exam, 
claiming that the personnel file used by the evaluators did not 
include evidence of the periodic merit ratings he was given 
during his years of employment. (R. 675). 
10. Collins further alleged that irregularities had taken place 
in the fact sheets which candidates had filled out for inclusion 
in their files and were improperly received. (Id.) (R.675). 
11. Because of these supposed irregularities, Collins felt that 
the promotability portion of the exam was based on "subjective 
and irrelevant criteria which prevented a competitive test fairly 
evaluating the skills of the participants." (Id.) (R. 675). 
12. Collins believed that his score on the fire simulation 
exercise was lowered because he failed to completely fill out an 
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organizational structure for the simulated incident. He further 
claimed that his score should not have been lowered because Salt 
Lake County Fire Department Policy expressly stated that filling 
out such charts in a fire incident was optional. (R. 675-6). 
13. Collins objected to the written section of the exam on three 
distinct grounds: 
a. First, Collins charged that the problem was 
not new and, therefore, five of the candidates had 
prior exposure to the question, whereas Collins had not 
been exposed to it. 
b. Second, Collins challenged that the exercise 
was not hypothetical, but rather was based on actual 
events within the Fire Department. Collins asserted 
that this resulted in two of the evaluators not being 
able to objectively review Collins solution to the 
problem because they were biased by their own handling 
of the situation. (Id.). 
c. Finally, Collins complained that uthe 
guidelines given the evaluators [do] not match the 
criteria given to the participants for the exercise." 
(R. 676) . 
14. Collins believed that some of the candidates had been 
improperly "prepped" for the exam. (Id.). 
15. A hearing on this grievance was heard before the Commission 
on July 20, 1988. (R. 678). 
16. At this hearing, Collins was represented by legal counsel, 
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Duane P. Smith. 
17. Collins' counsel specifically stated in the hearing that "we 
appeal not the entire test, but we appeal only from certain 
sections of the test." (R. 683). 
18. Collins' attorney also stated that "we will limit our appeal 
today and our discussion today to only those [sections discussed 
above]." (Id.). 
19. Collins' attorney admitted that they were "guessing" about 
his allegation that the command organizational chart was a factor 
in his receiving a low score on the fire simulation exercise. 
20. In sworn testimony before the Commission, Assistant Chief 
Robert Swenson testified that the reason the merit ratings were 
removed from every candidates' personnel file for the 
promotability portion of the exam was that the experience in the 
department was that such ratings were unreliable. (R. 753-754). 
21. The Commission also heard testimony from Mr. Swenson that he 
wrote the fire simulation problem and that Mr. Jim Christiansen 
wrote the grading guidelines for that problem after the two had a 
meeting to discuss the problem. Moreover, Mr. Swenson testified 
that those two also met with the full evaluation panel to review 
the grading criteria. (R. 755-758) . 
22. Mr. Swenson also testified that if a candidate did not fill 
out the organizational chart the candidate's score would not 
suffer. (R. 758-760) . 
23. Mr. Swenson, on cross examination, testified that he 
believed that the evaluators had sufficient knowledge to fairly 
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judge all the candidates on the promotability portion of the 
exam. (R. 765). Mr. Swenson believed this because of the length 
of service all the candidates had with the department, and the 
relatively small number of captains and battalion chiefs in the 
department. (R. 765-66). 
Mr. Jim Christiansen testified under sworn testimony as follows: 
24. He testified that there was a long standing policy of not 
using any candidates7 merit ratings in determining that 
candidates' promotability score. This was due to the 
unreliability of such ratings. (R. 770-771). 
25. He testified that he believed, given all the factors, that 
the composition of the promotability board was fair. (R. 772-
775) . 
26. He testified that under the evaluation guide for the fire 
simulation exercise, whether or not a candidate filled out an 
organizational chart was irrelevant to that candidate's rating. 
(R. 781-782). 
27. He testified that the written problem was the same problem 
from 1986, and that indeed, five of the eight participants had 
seen the problem before. (R. 783). 
28. However, he also testified that both the County Fire 
Department and the Sheriff's Office had often used the same 
questions on subsequent exams. There was no perceived bias in 
this practice. (R. 784). 
29. Moreover, Mr. Christiansen testified that the scores on the 
written exam for the five repeat candidates, on a whole, were 
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lower the second time they were exposed to the question. (R. 
785) . 
30. The first time candidates, as a whole, scored higher than 
the repeat candidates on the written exercise. (R. 784-788). 
31. He testified that the exam was designed to test as many 
areas of knowledge and skill as possible and that it is not 
uncommon in these exams for a candidate to do well in certain 
areas of the test and poorly in others. (R. 788-790). 
32. This would explain the relatively minor differences between 
Collins' scores on the portions of the exam graded by evaluators 
from outside the department, which were both oral interviews, 
with his lower scores on inside evaluated portions, which tested 
different skills. (R. 790). 
33. Mr. Christiansen testified that the written exercise problem 
from the exam had originally been developed for a California 
police department's sergeant exam. (R. 790-791). 
34. He testified that any similarity between the problem and any 
incident in the Fire Department was purely coincidental. (R. 
791) . 
35. Mr. Christiansen expressed his opinion that the scoring 
guidelines for the written exercise were fair because uit was the 
kind of problem that alternate solutions or conclusions may have 
been equally good." (R. 797-798). Commission's findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and decision dated August 18, 1988. (R. 
886-898) . 
36. After hearing all this testimony, the Commission ruled that 
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there was competent evidence to "conclude that each separate 
phase, and the examination in its entirety, meets the statutory 
requirement that it shall be 'public, competitive and free' and 
'shall fairly test the fitness in every respect of the persons 
examined.'" (R. 897-898). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Commission asserts that there has been no error in the 
dsiposition of this case. From the record of both the district 
court and the Commission hearing itself, it is clear that the 
1988 Battalion Chief's Examination was given in complete 
accordance with statutory and constitutional requirements. It is 
also clear that the hearing afforded Collins on his grievance of 
the exam was fair, constitutional, and should be upheld. 
The District Court properly concluded that the Commission 
acted properly in having Jim Christiansen prepare the Battalion 
Chief's exam. There was no statutory provision against this 
practice. Indeed Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-28-3 & -4 allowed for the 
Commission to have a secretary who could provide any serivice 
that the Commission might require. The District Court correctly 
ruled that Jim Christiansen performed the duites contemplated by 
that statute. Changes to the Fire Civil Service statutes in 1992 
offer Collins no grounds to challenge the role of Jim 
Christiansen in preparing the exam. 
The district court committed no error in finding that the 
Commission fulfilled its statutory obligations in administering 
the exam. Collins has presented no evidence whatsoever that the 
exam was not a fair test of the requisite skills of the 
candidates to the exam. In fact the record of the hearing at the 
Commission provides ample evidence to support the conclusion that 
the exam was fair. 
Furthermore, there was no due process violation in the 
Commission hearing Collins7 grievance. Collins never 
specifically points to any particular bias of the Commission 
towards his appeal. To the contrary, when the due process 
protections afforded Collins are considered, it is apparent that 
there was no bias to Collins in the hearing before the 
Commission, and that that hearing complied with all due process 
requirements. 
Finally, the district court correctly upheld the decision 
of the Commission that the examination was fair. The district 
court correclty ruled that the Commission had susbstantial 
evidence on which to base its decision, and ptherefore the 
decision should be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The district court correctly determined that the 
Commission could properly have Jim Christiansen 
prepare the exam. 
The testimony was undisputed that Jim Christiansen prepared 
the 1988 Battalion Chief's examination on the behalf of the 
Commission. Collins charges that there was no authority for the 
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Commission to allow Christiansen to prepare the exam for them. 
The district court found that Christiansen was acting for 
the Commission in the role of secretary in 1988. (R. ). This 
position was a stautorily defined role, with responsibility for 
clerical duties and "such other service as may be required by 
such civil service commission." Utah Code Ann. §17-28-4 (1987). 
Collins challenges the court's finding on this point based upon 
testimony from a retired Civil Service board member, Clare 
Rasmussen who stated that Mr. Christiansen did not perform the 
secretarial duties for the board. However, it also must be 
remebered that Mr.Rasmussen also believed that Jim Christiansen 
was a member of the Board of Commissioners, which he was not. It 
is fair from the record, to assume that the district court took 
the clarity of Mr.Rasmussen's memory into consideration when 
evaluating his testimony. The trail court's determination of fact 
that it appeared that Mr. Christiansen performed the duties of 
secretary is entilted to deference by this court. Dall v. State 
888 P.2d 680, 685. (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
In short, the district court, after hearing evidence and 
reviewing the record of the administrative proceeding, found that 
Mr. Christiansen performed the duties of secretary to the 
Commission in 1988. Moreover, the language found in Section §17-
28-4 provided ample support for the trial court's decision that 
one of the duties contemplated in that section was the 
preparation of an exam. Therefore, this court should uphold that 
decision. 
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II. The district court correclty ruled that the 
Commission had fulfilled its statutory duty to 
conduct a fair exam. 
The district court considered evidence from both witnesses 
and from the record of the proceeding below in determining that 
the Commission properly fulfilled its statutory obligations under 
the statute. The statute requires that the test be fair. The 
district court found, based on the facts presented, that the exam 
was fair. This finding is entitled to deference by this court. 
In particular, this finding is entitled to be upheld because 
Collins7 has not marshalled any evidence to indicate why the exam 
itself was not fair. 
The main assertion that Collins makes regarding the fairness 
of the exam is restating his first argument concerning the role 
of Jim Christiansen in preparing the exam. He initimates that 
this impacts onthe fairness of the exam. However, there is not 
one citation tothe record that this somehow made the exam unfair. 
Without some nexus, there is no logical connection between the 
two factors. 
It is impossible to ascertain any relationship between the 
fairness of the exam and the person who prepared it. Indeed 
Collins asserts no evidence on this point whatsoever. 
His second assertion under this argument again stems from 
his concerns about Jim Christiansen's role in the exam. 
Essentially the argument is made that the Commission did not 
"give" the exam as required by Utah Code Ann. §78-28-7 (1987). 
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The district court however, found that the Commission did indeed 
give the exam.The fact that Mr. Christiansen actually prepared 
the exam does not indicate in any way that aanyone other htan the 
Commission actually administered it. Particualrly illuminating 
on this point is the fact that the Commission retained 
responsibility for the exam, including the determinations of its 
adequacy and fairness. This interpretation is consistent with 
what the statutes requied the Commission to do. Its role was to 
insu're the fairness of the examinations. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-
28-7 (1987). There was no statutory requirement that the members 
of the Commission be in anyway experts in the administration of a 
technical promotion exam. 
III. The trial court correctly ruled that there were no 
due process violations in the proceedings before 
the Commission. 
Collins asks this Court to overrule the trial court's 
decision that the proceeding before the Commission were fair and 
constitutional. He cites no evidence of any particular instances 
of bias or prejudice on the part of the Commission that would 
warrant such action. 
It is axiomatic that "every person who brings a claim . . . 
at a hearing held before an administrative agency has a due 
process right to recieve a fair trial in front of a fair 
tribunal. Bunnell v. Industrial Comm'n., 740 P.2d 1331 (Utah 
1987). What Collins neglects to provide this court is any 
particular evidence of unfairness or deprivation of due process. 
In fact, review of the record indicates that he was afforded the 
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full panoply of due process protections. He had assistance of 
counsel and was entitled to call and cross examine witnesses. 
Collins now challenges that the hearing denied him due 
process because the Commission responsible for the exam was the 
same Commission that heard his grievance. He makes this argument 
"in the abstract, and without specificity, and without any record 
citation in support thereof." Thomas J. Peck &Sonsv. Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n, 700 P.2d 119, 1123 (Utah 1985) (declining to find due 
process violations simply because the administrative law judge 
who denied a grievant's application also heard the grievance). 
Without any evidence that the proceeding before the Commission 
was in fact unfair to Collins, then this Court should not disturb 
the decision of the trial court on this issue. 
IV. The district court correctly upheld the decision 
of the Commission. 
Collins argues that the district court should have 
overturned the Commission's finding that the 1988 Battalion 
Chief's examination was fair. However, Collins cites no 
compelling support for this argument. As outlined in the fact 
section above, the Commission had ample, reliable evidence upon 
which to base its conclusion that the examination was fair. All 
of Collins' allegations were specifically answered by the 
Commission with citation to credible evidence in support thereof. 
This Court should uphold the Commission's finding that the 
exam was fair upheld that decision rests on "substantial 
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evidence." See Hercules Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 877 P.2d 
169 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). u'Substantial evidence is 'such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 
to support a conclusion.'" Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 
116 P.2d 63, 68 Utah Ct. App. 1989)(quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund 
v. Hunnicutt, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (Idaho 1985)). Moreover, if 
there is conflicting evidence, the job of resolving that conflict 
is left to the administrative body, not the appellate court. Id. 
(Citing Board of Educ. of Montgomery County v. Paynter, 491 A.2d 
1186, 1193 (Md. 1985). 
In this case, it is apparent that the Commission had 
substantial evidence upon which to rely in issuing its finding 
that the examination was fair. 
Because Collins cannot carry his burden of demonstrating 
that there were not substantial facts to support the Commission's 
finding that the exam was fair, that decision must be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission respectfully 
requests that this Court uphold the decision of the district 
court dismissing Collins' petition. 
DATED this day of January 1997. 
DOUGLAS R. SHORT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
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ADDENDUM 
CONTENTS OF ADDENDUM 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B (1988) A-l 
Rule 65A 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
—Trespass. 
Sewer. 
Evidence of plaintiffs chain of title and of 
the trespass across his farm by defendant's con-
dominium sewer line was sufficient for the is-
suance of a permanent injunction, and there 
was no need to plead or prove that the sewer 
line was wrongfully installed. Ferguson v. 
Chnstensen, 531 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975) 
Jurisdiction. 
—Pending appeal. 
Motion for injunction to restrain dissipation 
of marital assets during the pendency of the 
appeal of the divorce action should be filed 
with the district court; any jurisdiction Su-
preme Court may have in such matters should 
be invoked only afler a party has sought relief 
in the district court, in all but the most excep-
tional circumstances. Warren v. Warren, 642 
P.2d 385 (Utah 1982). 
Security. 
—Not required. 
Unlikelihood of harm. 
The trial judge has wide discretion in the 
matter of requiring security upon issuance of a 
restraining order, and if there is an absence of 
proof showing a likelihood of harm, certainly 
no bond is necessary. Corporation of President 
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
v. Wallace, 673 P.2d 1285 (Utah 1978) 
—Recovery of damages. 
Demand. 
Enjoined party's filing of notice of claim on 
bond with district court, stating that the party 
intended to assert at some future time its claim 
on bond, cannot be deemed to have been a de-
mand on bond upon which the enjoined party 
failed to take action precluding it from pursu-
ing a separate action Mountain States Tel. & 
Tel Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 
681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984). 
Notice. 
Fact that this rule eliminates the necessity 
of an independent action for damages as a re-
sult of an injunction, by providing that liability 
COLLATERAL 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions 
§8 10, 14, 48 to 52, 69 et seq., 265, 296 to 303, 
310 to 316. 
C.J.S. — 43 C.J S Injunctions §§ 8, 16, 22 to 
24, 36 et seq., 165, 166. 180, 206, 208 
A.L.R. — Infant's employment contract, en-
forceability of covenant not to compete in, 17 
A.L R 3d 863 
on the surety bond "may be enforced on motion 
without the necessity of an independent action 
on the bond," does not normally eliminate the 
necessity of giving the adverse party some no-
tice and an opportunity to meet the issue by 
filing a motion or a counterclaim for relief 
Fillmore City v. Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316 (Utah 
1977). 
Separate action. 
Subdivision (c) of this rule does not preclude 
a separate action on an injunction bond; 
rather, it allows an action on the bond to be 
enforced in the action in which it is filed at the 
option of the enjoined party. Mountain States 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Char-
tered, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984). 
Wrongfully issued injunction. 
If the restraining or enjoinder is not wrong, 
ful, the party enjoined has no basis for recovery 
on the bond; if, however, it is found that the 
injunction was wrongfully issued, the enjoined 
party has an action for costs and damages in-
curred as a result of the wrongfully issued in-
junction. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 
1258 (Utah 1984). 
Damages incurred as a result of wrongfully 
issued injunction are limited to the amount of 
the bond where the injunction was obtained in 
good faith and may include attorney fees of the 
party wrongfully enjoined. Mountain States 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Char-
tered, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984). 
The award of attorney fees to be paid from an 
injunction bond should be limited only to the 
hours spent by defendants' counsel as a result 
of the wrongfully issued injunction Beard v. 
Dugdale, 741 P 2d 968 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Showing by party sought to be enjoined. 
—Operation of nuisance. 
A defendant who wants to operate a plant 
which has been declared to be a nuisance is 
required to offer evidence to the court as to how 
the plant can be used without creating a nui-
sance before he can complain that the court did 
not tell him how he could use his plant. Draper 
v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 121 Utah 567, 244 
P.2d 360 (1952). 
REFERENCES 
Appealability of contempt adjudication or 
conviction, 33 A.L.R.3d 448. 
Review other than by appeal or writ of error, 
contempt adjudication or conviction as subject 
to, 33 A.L.R.3d 589. 
Propriety of permanently enjoining one 
guilty of unauthorized use of trade secret from 
engaging in sale or manufacture of device in 
question, 38 A.L.R.3d 572. 
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Propriety of injunctive relief against diver- Recovery of damages resulting from wrong-
of water by municipal corporation or pub- ful issuance of injunction as limited to amount 
£ utility. 42 A.L R.3d 426. of bond, 30 A.L.R.4th 273. 
p^jjminary mandatory injunction to pre- Right of employee to injunction preventing 
I correct, or reduce effects of polluting employer from exposing employee to tobacco 
Ilctices, 49 A.L.R.3d 1239. smoke in workplace, 37 A.L R 4th 480. 
*What constitutes fraud or forgery justifying Propriety of federal court injunction against 
rtftlsal to honor, or injunction against honor- suit in foreign country, 78 A.L.R. Fed. 831. 
u* letter of credit under UCC § 5-114(1), (2), Key Numbers. — Injunction •=» 9 et seq., 
tf AL.R.4th 239. 143, 148, 150, 189, 190, 204, 213. 
Rule 65B. Extraordinary writs. 
(a) Special forms of writs abolished. Special forms of pleadings and of 
writs in habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition, and 
other extraordinary writs, as heretofore known, are hereby abolished. Where 
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy exists, relief may be obtained by 
appropriate action under these rules, on any one of the grounds set forth in 
Subdivisions (b) and (0 of this rule. 
(b) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: 
(1) where any person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exer-
cises a public office, civil or military, or a franchise, or an office in a 
corporation created by the authority of this state; or any public officer, 
civil or military, does or permits to be done any act which by the provi-
sions of law works a forfeiture of his office; or an association of persons act 
as a corporation within this state without being legally incorporated; or 
any corporation has offended against any provision of the law, as it may 
have been amended, by or under which law such corporation was created, 
altered or renewed; or any corporation has forfeited its privileges and 
franchises by nonuser or has committed an act amounting to a surrender 
or a forfeiture of its corporate rights, privileges and franchises or has 
misused a franchise or privilege conferred upon it by law, or exercised a 
franchise or privilege not so conferred; or 
(2) where an inferior tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial func-
tions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; or 
(3) where the relief sought is to compel any inferior tribunal, or any 
corporation, board or person to perform an act which the law specially 
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station; or to compel the 
admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which 
he is entitled and from which he is unlawfully excluded by such inferior 
tribunal or by such corporation, board or person; or 
(4) where the relief sought is to arrest the proceedings of any tribunal, 
corporation, board or person, whether exercising functions judicial or 
ministerial, when such proceedings are without or in excess of the juris-
diction of such tribunal, corporation, board or person. 
(c) Action by attorney general under Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule. 
The attorney general may, and when directed so to do by the governor shall, 
commence any action authorized by the provisions of Subdivision (b)(1) of this 
rule. Such action shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. 
(d) Action by private person under Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule. A 
person claiming to be entitled to a public or private office unlawfully held and 
exercised by another may bring an action therefor. A private person may 
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bring an action upon any other ground set forth in Subdivision (b)(1) of ttoj 
rule, only if the attorney general fails to do so after notice. Any such action 
commenced by a private person shall be brought in his own name. Upon filjhi 
the complaint, such person shall also file an undertaking with sufficient sure! 
ties, in the same form required of bonds on appeal under the provision of RujJ 
73 and conditioned that such person will pay any judgment for costs or dam. 
ages recovered against him in such action. 
(e) Nature and extent of relief under Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. 
Upon the filing of a complaint seeking relief under Subdivision (b)(2) of this 
rule, the court may require notice to be given to the adverse party before 
issuance of the writ, or may grant an order to show cause why such writ' 
should not be issued, or may grant the writ without notice. If the writ ia 
granted, it shall be directed to the inferior tribunal, board, or officer, or to any 
other person having the custody of the record or proceedings, commanding 
such tribunal, board or officer to certify fully to the court issuing the writ, 
within a specified time, a transcript of the record and proceedings, describing 
or referring to them with sufficient certainty; and if a stay of proceedings U 
intended, requiring the party in the meantime to desist from further proceed-
ings in the matter to be reviewed. The review by the court issuing the writ 
shall not be extended further than to determine whether the inferior tribunal, 
board or officer has regularly pursued the authority of such tribunal, board or 
officer. 
(f) Habeas corpus. Appropriate relief by habeas corpus proceedings shall 
be granted whenever it appears to the proper court that any person is unjustly 
imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his liberty. If the person seeking relief 
is imprisoned in the penitentiary and asserts that in the proceedings which 
resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under 
the Constitution of the United States or under the Constitution of the state of 
Utah, or both, then the person seeking such relief shall proceed in accordance 
with Rule 65B(i). In all other cases, proceedings under this subdivision shall 
be conducted in accordance with the following provisions: 
(1) The complaint seeking relief shall, among other things, state that 
the person designated is illegally restrained of his liberty by the defen-
dant and the place where he is so restrained, if known (stating wherein 
and the cause or pretense thereof, according to the best information of the 
plaintiff, annexing a copy of any legal process or giving a satisfactory 
explanation for failing so to do); that the legality of the imprisonment or 
restraint has not already been adjudged upon a prior proceeding; whether 
another complaint for the same relief has been filed and relief thereunder 
denied by any court, and if so attaching a copy of such complaint and 
stating the reasons for the denial of relief or giving satisfactory reasons 
for the failure to do so. 
(2) The complaint shall be filed in the court most convenient to the plaintiff. 
(3) Upon the filing of the complaint the court shall, unless it appears 
from such complaint or the showing of the plaintiff that he is not entitled 
to any relief, issue a writ directed to the defendant commanding him to 
bring the person alleged to be restrained before the court at a time and 
place therein specified, at which time the court shall proceed in a sum-
mary manner to hear the matter and render judgment accordingly. If the 
writ is not issued the court shall state its reasons therefor in writing and 
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file the same with the complaint, and shall deliver a copy thereof to the 
plaintiff. 
(4) If the defendant cannot be found, or if he does not have such person 
in custody, the writ (and any other process issued) may be served upon 
any one having such person in custody, in the manner and with the same 
effect as if he had been made defendant in the action. 
(5) If the defendant conceals himself, or refuses admittance to the per-
son attempting to serve the writ, or if he attempts wrongfully to carry the 
person imprisoned or restrained out of the county or state after service of 
the writ, the person serving the writ shall immediately arrest the defen-
dant, or other person so resisting, and bring him, together with the person 
designated in the writ, forthwith before the court before which the writ is 
made returnable. 
(6) At the time of the issuance of the writ, the court may, if it appears 
that the person designated will be carried out of the jurisdiction of the 
court or will suffer some irreparable injury before compliance with the 
writ can be enforced, cause a warrant to issue, reciting the facts, and 
directing the sheriff to take such person and forthwith bring him before 
the court to be dealt with according to law. 
(7) The defendant shall appear at the proper time and place with the 
person designated or show good cause for not doing so and must answer 
the complaint within the time allowed. The answer must state plainly 
and unequivocally whether he then has, or at any time has had, the 
person designated under his control and restraint, and if so, the cause 
thereof. If such person has been transferred, the defendant must state 
that fact, and to whom, when the transfer was made, and the reason or 
authority therefor. The writ shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form 
or misdescription of the person restrained or defendant, if enough is 
stated to show the meaning and intent thereof. 
(8) The person restrained may waive his right to be present at the 
hearing, in which case the writ shall be modified accordingly. Pending a 
determination of the matter the court may place such person in the cus-
tody of such individual or individuals as may be deemed proper. 
(g) [Deleted.] 
(h) When writ returnable. Any alternative writ issued by a court or a 
judge thereof, may be made returnable, and a hearing thereon may be had, at 
any time as such court may in its discretion determine, 
(i) Postconviction hearings. 
(1) Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary or county jail under a 
commitment of any court, whether such imprisonment be under an origi-
nal commitment or under a commitment for violation of probation or 
parole, who asserts that in any proceedings which resulted in his commit-
ment there was a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution 
of the United States or of the state of Utah, or both, may institute a 
proceeding under this rule. 
Such proceedings shall be commenced by filing a complaint, together 
with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the court in which such relief is 
sought. The complainant shall also serve a copy of the complaint so filed 
upon the attorney general of the state of Utah if imprisoned in the state 
prison, or the county attorney of the county where imprisoned if in 8 
county jail. Such service may be made by any of the methods provided foi 
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service in Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or by mailing such 
copy to the attorney general or county attorney by United States mail 
postage prepaid, and by filing with the clerk of said court a certificate of 
mailing certifying under oath that a copy was so mailed to the attorney 
general or county attorney. Upon the filing of such a complaint, the clerk 
shall promptly bring the same to the attention of the presiding judge of 
the court in which such complaint is filed. 
(2) The complaint shall state that the person seeking relief is illegally 
restrained of his liberty by the defendant; shall state the place where he 
is so restrained; shall state the dates of and identify the proceedings in 
which the complainant was convicted and by which he was subsequently 
confined and of which he now complains; and shall set forth in plain and 
concise terms the factual data constituting each and every manner in 
which the complainant claims that any constitutional rights were vio-
lated. The complaint shall have attached thereto affidavits, copies of 
records, or other evidence supporting such allegations, or shall state why 
the same are not attached. 
The complaint shall also state whether or not the judgment of convic-
tion that resulted in the confinement complained of has been reviewed on 
appeal, and if so, shall identify such appellate proceedings and state the 
results thereof. 
The complaint shall further state that the legality or constitutionality 
of his commitment or confinement has not already been adjudged in a 
prior habeas corpus or other similar proceeding; and if the complainant 
shall have instituted prior similar proceedings in any court, state or fed-
eral, within the state of Utah, he shall so state in his complaint, shall 
attach a copy of any pleading filed in such court by him to his complaint, 
and shall set forth the reasons for the denial of relief in such other court. 
In such case, if it is apparent to the court in which the proceeding under 
this rule is instituted that the legality or constitutionality of his confine-
ment has already been adjudged in such prior proceedings, the court shall 
forthwith dismiss such complaint, giving written notice thereof by mail to 
the complainant, and no further proceedings shall be had on such com-
plaint. 
(3) Argument, citations and discussion of authorities shall not be set 
forth in the complaint, but may be set out in a separate supporting memo-
randum or brief if the complainant so desires. 
(4) All claims of the denial of any of complainant's constitutional rights 
shall be raised in the postconviction proceeding brought under this rule 
and may not be raised in another subsequent proceeding except for good 
cause shown therein. 
(5) If the complainant is not represented by counsel when the com-
plaint is filed, he shall advise the court upon filing his complaint whether 
he intends to employ his own counsel, and if he does not do so, or if he 
requests the court to appoint counsel, the presiding judge shall forthwith 
appoint counsel to represent complainant and shall give notice to the 
complainant and the attorney general or county attorney of such appoint-
ment. 
(6) Within ten days after service of a copy of the complaint upon him, 
the attorney general, or the county attorney, as the case may be, shall 
answer the complaint or otherwise plead thereto. Any further pleadings 
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or amendments shall be in conformity with the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
(7) When an answer is filed, the court shall immediately set the case 
for a hearing within twenty days thereafter unless the court in its discre-
tion determines that further time is needed. Prior to the hearing, the 
state or county shall obtain such transcript of proceedings or court records 
as may be relevant and material to the case. The court, on its own motion, 
or upon the request of either party, may order a prehearing conference if 
good reason exists therefor; but such conference shall not be set so as to 
unreasonably delay the hearing on the merits of the complaint. The com-
plainant shall be brought before the court for any hearing or conference. 
If the court in which the complaint is filed determines that in the 
interest of convenience and economy, the hearing should be transferred to 
the district court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement of 
complainant, the court may enter a written order transferring such case 
and shall set forth in such order its reasons for so doing. 
(8) In each case, the court, upon determining the case, shall enter spe-
cific findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment, in writing, and 
the same shall be made a part of the record in the case. 
If the court finds in favor of the complainant, it shall enter an appropri-
ate order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the former 
roceedings and such further orders with respect to rearraignment, retrial, 
custody, bail or discharge as the court may deem just and proper in the 
case. 
(9) If the complainant is unable to pay the costs of the proceedings, he 
may proceed in forma pauperis upon the filing of an affidavit to that 
effect, in which event the court may direct the costs to be paid by the 
county in which he was originally charged. 
(10) Any final judgment entered upon such complaint may be appealed 
to and reviewed by the Supreme Court of Utah as an appeal in civil cases. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1985). 
Amendment Notes. — Subdivision (g), re- which applies the federal rules to proceedings 
lating to proceedings where extraordinary for habeas corpus. 
writs are sought in the Supreme Court, was The federal statute governing remedies on 
repealed with the adoption of the Utah Rules of motion attacking sentence appears at 28 
Appellate Procedure (now the Rules of the U S C. § 2255. 
Utah Supreme Court), effective January I, Cross-Referencea. - Corporations, Title 
1985. For present provisions, see Rules 19 and g^ 
20 R. Utah S Ct. and, particularly, the Com-
 S t a t u t e o f U m i t a t i o n 8 f o r h a b e a 8 ^^^ a c . 
mittee Note following Rule 20. lion, § 78-12-31.1. 
Compiler's Notes. - There .s no federal limitations for postconviction re-
rule covering the subject matter contained in .. - . . __
 0
 v 
this rule, except for Rule 81(a)(2), F.R.C.P.. h e f a c t l o n« § 78-12-31.2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Abolishment of special forms. 
—Mandamus. 
—Nature of present remedy. 
Grounds 
—•Certiorari. 
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